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Abstract 
We  develop  a  three  region  - U.S.,  Mexico,  and Rest-of-World  - simulation 
model  to analyze  the effects on the agricultural sector of a  potential 
preferential trading arrangement  (PTA)  between Mexico  and the United States. 
The  simulation exercises  indicate that two-way  agricultural trade  increases 
and welfare  improves  in the United States and Mexico  from  a  bilateral 
preferential agreement  on agricultural products.  Our  results  show  that when 
border protection is eliminated by  the United States and Mexico,  bilateral 
agricultural trade expands  by over  15  percent.  Relative  to the size of the 
two  agricultural sectors,  however,  the overall  impact is very small  for the 
U.S.  agricultural sector but there  is a  more  significant adjustment for 
Mexican agriculture. 
Keywords:  preferential trading arrangements,  simulation model,  agricultural 
trade,  United States and Mexico. 
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Summary 
We  develop  a  simulation model,  using a  1988  base period,  to  show  how  a 
preferential trading arrangement  (PTA)  that removes  all bilateral trade 
distortions would affect the agricultural sectors of the United States and 
Mexico.  Our  results  show  that when  border protection is eliminated by the  two 
trading partners,  agricultural 
trade  increases  $650  million,  all 
other factors held constant 
(Figure 1).  This  increase 
represents over  a  15  percent 
expansion from  the  $4 billion two-
way  trade in 1988. 
In our model,  U.S. 
agricultural exports  to Mexico 
increase approximately  20  percent, 
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mostly in grains,  oilseeds,  livestock,  and meats.  U.S.  coarse grain exports 
to Mexico  rise by  60  percent,  making Mexico  more  strongly entrenched as  the 
number  three  importer of U.S.  coarse grains behind Japan and the Soviet Union. 
Additionally,  if Mexico  experienced a  10 percent  income  growth due  to  the  PTA, 
U.S.  agricultural exports  to Mexico  would rise by an additional 7  percent. 
Mexican exports  to  the United States would also increase.  We  estimate an 
agricultural export expansion of 10 percent,  mostly in feeder cattle and 
fruits  and vegetables.  Feede~ cattle exports to  the United States increase 
approximately  20  percent,  frozen orange juice concentrate  (FCOJ)  nearly 50 
1 percent,  and fresh  tomatoes  10  percent.  Even with the  increased exports  to 
the United States,  the Mexican share of the U.S.  fruit and vegetable market 
remains  quite  small,  approximately 4  percent in FCOJ,  for  instance. 
Our  simulation model  shows  that a  U.S.- Mexican  PTA  causes  less  than a  1 
percent contraction in U.S.  and Mexican agricultural imports  from other 
countries.  For  the United States,  there  is a  small  decrease  in imports, 
almost entirely due  to  FCOJ.  Mexican  imports  from non-U.S.  sources,  mostly 
distributed across  grains  and oilseeds,  decline  7  percent.  Mexico's  southern 
neighbors,. principally Argentina and Brazil,  would have  small  adverse effects 
from  this decline  in Mexican  imports. 
Net producer  income  is enhanced approximately 1  percent in the United 
States.  Most  of the  gain occurs  in cereals and oilseeds.  Savings  are also 
realized on U.S.  government agricultural programs--farm subsidies are reduced 
3  percent.  Hence,  farmers,  given the opportunity of foreign access,  can rely 
more  on markets  rather than on  government  subsidies.  There  is also a  small 
decline  in tariff revenues  collected on horticultural commodities  and a  less 
than 2  percent decrease  in production of the modeled horticultural 
commodities. 
With no border protection,  prices of farm products would fall in Mexico. 
Mexican consumers,  including intermediate demanders  of feed grains,realize 
welfare gains equivalent to over  5  percent of the value of Mexican farm 
production due  to  lower  consumer prices.  Feeder cattle producers  gain 
significantly with removal  of a  high export tax.  Mexican fruit and vegetable 
farmers  also experience  small gains,  approximately  2  percent of farm value. 
Other Mexican producers,  mostly coarse grain farmers,  incur  income  losses with 
the  removal  of border protection. 
2 Our  results of the  trade and welfare effects  from  a  PTA  should be 
interpreted as benchmark estimates.  They  are dependent  on  the estimates of 
price distortions in 1988  caused by border protection.  Results of an actual 
agreement would probably differ from  our analysis in coverage  and timing.  We 
do  not attempt  to address what  an actual negotiated agreement may  look like. 
INTRODUCTION 
The  United States,  Canada,  and Mexico  are negotiating a  North American 
free  trade agreement  aimed at reducing barriers to trade and  increasing 
investment  and growth  among  the partners.  In this paper we  assess the trade 
and welfare effects of a  potential preferential trading agreement  (PTA)  on the 
agricultural sectors of the United States and Mexico.  We  focus  on the United 
States  and Mexico,  for it is in these  two  countries that the agricultural 
sectors would be most  affected by an agreement. 1  The  methodology for our 
analysis is to use  a  partial equilibrium 3-region,  29-commodity static model 
that emphasizes  specific agricultural sectors  (Table  1).2  The  regions  in the 
model  are:  the United States,  Mexico,  and Rest-of-World. 
The  model  is based on national product differentiation.  Each  country 
produces  a  product that can be distinguished from  other country producers. 
For  example,  U.S.,  Mexican,  and  ROW  corn are  assumed not to be homogeneous 
but,  instead,  are  imperfect substitutes.  In this way,  we  allow for possible 
1  Mielke et al.  explain that Canada's main interest in the negotiations 
is to maintain the preferred access  obtained in the U.S.- Canada Free Trade 
Agreement. 
2  The  model  uses  the Static World  Policy Simulation  (SWOPSLK)  framework 
developed by Roningen and extended by Roningen,  Sullivan and Dixit. 
3 expansion of trade between the United States and Mexico  and trade contraction 
between ROWand  the United States and between ROWand  Mexico. 


































The  partial equilibrium model  contains  commodity  supply and demand 
equations which are parameterized to reproduce  1988  data for  the United 
States,  Mexico,  and ROW.  We  call this our  BASE  solution and we  refer to the 
1988  data as  the base period.  After  two-way border protection is removed,  the 
model  recalculates prices and domestic  supply and demand  levels,  rebalancing 
trade in the process. 3  The  pattern of prices and quantities observed in the 
base period is then compared with the pattern that emerges  from  the revised 
solution.  Results  indicate what might have happened if a  PTA  existed in 1988 
3  The  removal  of Mexican  import restrictions,  for example,  lowers  the 
price of U.S.  produced corn that Mexicans  consume.  The  lower price encourages 
demand  for U.S.  produced corn and reduces  demand  for Mexican produced corn 
depending on  the elasticity of substitution. 
4 and if all other exogenous variables pertinent to agricultural markets 
remained the  same. 4 
We  analyze  a  PTA  under  three alternative sets of conditions.  In the first 
scenario,  where  we  place our major  emphasis,  we  assume  that a  PTA  between the 
United States and Mexico  is put in place under levels of protection and world 
market conditions that existed in 1988.  To  obtain this solution,  the base 
model  is modified by  removing price wedges  representing two-way border 
protection between the United States and Mexico.  Results  for  the  individual 
commodities  are presented for  this scenario.  Additionally,  four variants of 
scenario 1  are  analyzed to provide  some  sensitivity analysis.  These variants 
change  the assumptions  regarding Mexican domestic policies and consumption 
behavior on corn and poultry and assumptions  regarding  income  effects on 
Mexico  of a  PTA. 
The  second scenario assumes  that Mexico  unilaterally removes  all border 
protection with all countries.  This  solution is obtained by removing Mexico's 
border protection but making no  changes  for  the other two  countries.  This 
scenario represents  the  extreme of the policy direction taking place in Mexico 
since  the late 1980s.  It gives an indication of the  impacts  on world 
agriculture of Mexican  trade liberalization without a  U.S.- Mexico  PTA. 
The  third scenario combines  the first two  -- Mexico  is assumed to 
unilaterally remove  all border protection with all countries and it also 
enters  into a  preferential trade agreement with the United States.  This 
solution is obtained by removing Mexico's border protection for  the other  two 
countries and also removing U.S.  border protection for Mexican  imports. 
4  Details on the model  structure and the database can be  found  in Liapis, 
Krissoff,  and Neff. 
5 Borde~ protection remains  for all exports  to ROWand  for U.S.  and Mexican 
imports  from  ROW. 
This  third scenario,  when  compared with the first two,  indicates  (1)  the 
combined  impact of a  PTA  and unilateral liberalization in Mexico,  and  (2) 
which of these  two  changes  affect agriculture  the most  in each country.  A 
comparison with the first scenario gives  an  indication of how  the United 
States would be affected if Mexico  were  to first give  the United States sole 
free  access  to Mexican agricultural markets  (first scenario)  and then decide 
to  give all countries equal access  (third scenario).  A comparison with the 
second scenario gives  an indication of the  impact of putting in place a  U.S.-
Mexico  PTA  unilaterally 1ibera1izes--an extreme  extension of the reduction in 
trade barriers that is taking place  in Mexico. 
The  results presented here  describe  the  impact of each of the  three 
policy scenarios  in a  typical year after each scenario is fully  implemented 
and  the agricultural sectors of the participating countries  (and the Rest of 
the World)  have had several 1988-1ike years  in which  to adjust.  Thus,  we 
assume  that world agricultural markets were  in intermediate-run equilibrium 
under  1988  conditions.  "Intermediate-run"  means  that the  supply and demand 
elasticities in the model  represent about  a  3- to 5-year period of adjustment 
to changes  in policies and prices.  Each  scenario represents  an idealized 
case.  None  of the  three is claimed to represent a  likely outcome of 
negotiations. 
BACKGROUND 
In June  1990  Presidents  Bush  and Salinas agreed to move  toward a 
comprehensive  PTA  between the United States and Mexico  which  they stated "can 
6 be  a  powerful  engine  for  economic  development,  creating new  jobs and opening 
new  markets"  (Wagenheim).  U.S.- Mexican  trade  is already substantial and has 
sharply grown  since  the 1980s.  Mexico  purchases  about  7  percent of all u.s. 
merchandised exports,  the  third most  important U.S.  customer behind Japan and 
Canada.  The  United States consumes  approximately two-thirds of all Mexican 
exports. 
The  nature of U.S.-Mexican agricultural trade  is largely complementary. 
This  can be  illustrated by an intra-industry  :rade  index where  0  represents no 
trade within a  sector and 100  percent represents  an equal bilateral level of 
U.S.  and Mexican trade.  For cereals,  meats,  and dairy the  index equals nearly 
0,  a  considerably smaller number  than U.S.  bilateral trade with Canada  and the 
European Community  where  index numbers  are  in the  range of 40  to 50  percent 
(McDonald  and Hart). 
The  United States'  main  farm exports  to Mexico  are  feed grains,  oilseeds, 
live animals,  meat,  and dairy products  (Figure  2).  Mexico  supplies  the United 
States tropical products  and specialty crops  (Figure 3).  Since  1982,  Mexico 
has  ranked among  the  top  three 
suppliers of agricultural 
commodities  to the U.S., 
principally coffee,  fruits  and 
vegetables,  and live animals. 
Mexican trade and domestic 
policies have been undergoing 
considerable liberalization since 
U.S.  egricultural  exports to Mexico,  1990 
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1985  when  Mexico  indicated an interest in joining the General Agreement  on 
Tariffs and Trade  (GATT).  Agricultural reform is currently taking place  in 
7 compliance with  GATT  membership  even without a  free  trade  agreement.  The 
reforms  are aimed at reducing tariff protection,  decreasing government 
intervention in price policies,  reducing untargeted producer  and consumer 
subsidies,  and reducing  the  government's  role  in the production,  processing, 
and distribution of agricultural commodities.  Recent  reforms  include  the 
Mexican government  removing licensing requirements  for  sorghum  (1989)  and 
soybeans  intended for crushing  (1990),  allowing some  private sources of 
imports  for wheat,  and eliminating the price guarantee program and marketing 
subsidies except in corn and dry beans  (1990). 
The  agricultural and economywide  reforms have  contributed to the 
turnaround in the Mexican economy  which  grew 3.9 percent in 1990  and is 
expected to reach over  6  percent by the late 1990s.  Nevertheless,  th~re have 
been adjustment costs and 
political pressures  to slow or 
alter the path of reform.  The  U.S.  agrIcultural  Imports from  Mexfco,  1990 
1988/89  "agreement"  price system  FrUIU •  nuta  1D 
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producers  persuaded the  government 
to instate a  10 percent seasonal  J'iqure  3 
tariff to assure  the  40mestic  crop was  purchased first. 
S  The  "agreement"  among  producers,  distributors,  processors,  and 
government  is aimed at a  gradual adjustment to a  market price system.  The 
agreement price is negotiated on the basis of the  international price and the 
marketing costs associated with the selling of agricultural products.  In 
addition to  sorghum,  soybeans;  barley,  oats,  and rice are under  the new 
system. 
8 A PTA  with the United States  (and Canada)  would help encourage  the  reform 
process by further enhancing growth  and by  formalizing  the current Mexican 
liberalization process  in an international agreement.  The  PTA  may  reduce  the 
possibility of a  return to  inward oriented policies.  In the words  of a  (U.S.) 
Presidential transmittal to Congress,  it may  " ...  lock in the process of trade 
liberalization  ... and  ...  secure U.S.  access  to Mexican markets ...  " 
AGRICULTURAL  POLICY  PROFILES 
Domestic  and border policies that existed in 1988  are put into the model 
as price wedges.  They  represent estimates of price differentials inserted 
into  the marketplace by  government policies.  Each of the scenario results is 
obtained by removing selected policies and their associated price wedges  from 
the price equations  in the model,  and obtaining a  new  equilibrium solution. 
For further explanation of price wedges  in the  SWOPSIM  model,  see Roningen, 
Sullivan and Dixit. 
An  average of the model's border price wedges  (import tariff equivalent) 
for  the  four  commodity  groups  are  shown  below.  The  numbers  express in percent 
the price wedge  equivalent of border measures  divided by the  traded price. 
They  do  not include direct and indirect producer and consumer subsidies. 
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9 For policies as  they were  in 1988,  Mexican border price wedges  are 
greater than U.S.  wedges  except in horticultural products.  This  suggests  that 
a  bilateral liberalization will tend to  increase U.S.  agricultural exports 
more  than Mexico's. 
GRAINS  AND  OILSEEDS 
Border and domestic policy instruments are used in Mexico  to  influence 
the markets  in wheat,  corn,  other coarse grains  (mainly sorghum),  and 
oilseeds.  Through  the parastatal CONASUPO,  the Mexican  government restricts 
imports by  issuing limited import licenses.  It provides price supports,  input 
subsidies,  and crop  insurance  in order to assist farmers  and establish fixed 
minimum  domestic prices.  The  level of imports  are determined by the  gap 
between expected consumption needs  and domestic production.  By  restricting 
imports,  CONASUPO  limits  the  supply of crops,  raises domestic prices above 
world price levels and thus,  encourages  domestic  production.  The  1985-89 
average  PSEs  for corn,  sorghum,  and soybeans  are approximately 55  percent and 
for wheat  30  percent  (Valdes).  For each of these  commodities,  the border 
component usually comprises at least half of the support level. 
On  the  consumer  side,  import limitations cause  domestic prices to exceed 
world price levels.  To  offset the border policies,  CONASUPO  subsidizes corn, 
sorghum,  wheat,  soybeans,  and barley sold to agroprocessors.  Low  income 
consumers  are subsidized through CONASUPO'sdistribution and retail network. 
Most  corn in Mexico,  approximately 85  percent,  is used for human  consumption 
while  sorghum is primarily used as  a  feed grain for pork and pOUltry 
producers.  The  average  CSE  for  1985-89  is about  -25  percent on sorghum and 
soybeans  and  -15  percent for corn indicating that on net Mexico  is taxing its 
consumers.  An  exception is dry beans.  Imported and domestic dry beans are 
10 sold by  CONASUPO  at subsidized controlled prices below world price levels with 
CSEs  over  25  percent in the  late 1980s.  A caveat to  the  CSE  calculation is 
that the world market for dry beans  is very thin and a  world reference price 
is difficult to establish.  Hence,  the  consumer  subsidy/producer  tax may  be 
measured  inaccurately and this market was  not liberalized. 
In addition to regulating imports,  CONASUPO  purchases  grains  from  farmers 
and exporters.  When  CONASUPO  buys  from  producers,  it incurs  a  loss.  It sells 
to processors at an average market price that is generally lower  than the 
purchase price.  When  CONASUPO  purchases  imports  from  the United States or 
other exporters,  it does  so at the world price--a price  lower  than in domestic 
markets.  The  difference between the world price and the  domestic market price 
is a  gain -- a  "quota rent"  earned by  CONASUPO.  Hence,  on net,  CONASPPO 
through its purchases  and sales can attain a  net loss or gain depending on the 
difference between the world and domestic prices and the share of imports 
relative to  domestic production. 
LIVESTOCK.  MEATS.  AND  DAIRY 
Livestock and dairy operations are strongly affected by both input and 
output policies in Mexico.  Land  tenure  laws  limit farm size and severely 
restrict the  growing of feed crops  in conjunction with raising beef and dairy 
cattle,  thus  increasing operating costs.  Most cattle are fed on grass or 
forage.  Mexico  also restricts the  importation of feed grains,  raising input 
prices and  contributin~ to the high cost of pork and poultry operations. 
Mexico's pork and poultry production have become  more  concentrated using 
confined-feeding production systems  despite  the high costs of feeds.  High 
costs and  low profitability provide little incentive  to  invest in livestock 
industries. 
11 To  partially mitigate  the effects of land restrictions and costly inputs, 
Mexico  protects its livestock,  meats,  and dairy producers  from  foreign 
competition.  Import tariffs  (and in some  cases  import restrictions)  are 
placed on cattle, beef,  pork,  poultry,  butter,  and cheese.  Import tariffs or 
tariff equivalent estimates equal  10  to  20  percent for  these products  in 1988. 
In addition,  a  $60  per head export  tax  (about  20  percent of the  export price) 
is placed on cattle to discourage exports  and  increase domestic beef 
availability.  Nevertheless,  the price of beef is usually greater than most 
Mexican consumers  can afford. 
Poultry,  eggs,  and fresh milk  (mostly reconstituted from powder)  are  the 
principal sources of animal protein.  Mexico  attempts  to maintain egg,  pOUltry 
meat,  and fresh milk prices within the reach of low  income  consumers by 
controlling prices and subsidies  to consumers.  One  problem that Mexico  faces 
with its dairy policies is that producers have  incentives  to divert excessive 
amounts  of fresh milk into dairy products,  which  do not have price controls. 
The  trade effects on livestock of eliminating grain,  oilseed,  livestock, 
and dairy trade barriers vis-a-vis the United States are unclear a  priori. 
Removing  the  import restrictions and tariffs on feed grains  and meals  would 
reduce  operating costs in livestock and dairy operations.  The  removal  of 
import barriers on livestock and dairy products will increase the competition 
that Mexican producers will face.  Whether  the lowering of import costs has  a 
greater production effect relative to  the  lowering of output prices is 
ambiguous.  The  level of government  intervention in feeds  and in livestock, 
the share of feed costs to total costs in livestock production,  and consumer 
responsiveness  to price changes  in domestic  and foreign livestock products are 
12 the key variables  in determining whether Mexico  increases or decreases  imports 
of beef,  pork,  poultry,  and dairy. 
HORTICULTURAL  COMMODITIES 
The  horticultural commodities  covered in this study have  a  commonality; 
import tariffs are placed on these products when  entering the U.S.  market. 
The  United States  imposes  a  tariff rate either all year  round or during 
certain seasons  on each of them. 
The  average  trade-weighted tariff on all Mexican horticultural 
commodities  imported into the United States is about  5  percent,  although the 
range  in the ad valorem rates are  from  0  to  35  percent  (Burfisher and 
Langley).  The  most valuable vegetable crops  imported from Mexico  that now 
face  the highest U.S.  tariffs are asparagus,  broccoli,  and cauliflower. 
Mexican fresh fruit facing  the highest U.S.  tariffs are cantaloupes  and 
watermelons.  U.S.  tariffs on processed horticultural items  are relatively 
high for broccoli,  tomato paste,  and orange juice.  Our  analysis  includes only 
the  traded horticultural commodities  that account for  the largest current 
trade shares,  namely--cucumbers,  onions,  peppers,  tomatoes,  melons,  and frozen 
orange juice concentrate  (FCOJ).  FCOJ  has  the highest u.S.  import tariff rate 
of nearly 30  percent. 
For  some  horticultural products,  Mexican exports are complementary to 
u.S.  production.  A good example  is cantaloupes.  About  70  percent of u.S. 
melon  imports  come  during December  to April.  During this period,  the tariff 
is zero because  the United States is not producing cantaloupes.  Mexico's 
production overlaps U.S.  production mainly in May  and June.  During the  35 
percent tariff period from mid-September  to December  and mid-Kay  through July, 
only about  20  percent of U.S.  melon  imports  come  from Mexico.  This  smaller 
13 share pulls down  the weighted average tariff for Mexican melons  to  5  percent. 
The  weighted average tariff for all melons  is 10.5 percent. 
The  u.s.  Department of Agriculture regulates  some  horticultural markets 
with marketing orders.  They  are agreements  among  U.S.  producers  approved by 
the u.s.  Department of Agriculture to meet specific standards  in their 
production and distribution relating to product quality,  size,  and maturity. 
If the  grade  and size requirements affect foreign producers'  exports,  then the 
marketing orders would constitute a  trade barrier.  For  instance,  Bredahl,  et 
al.  indicate that tomato  minimum  sizes for vine-ripe  tomatoes  (produced 
primarily in Mexico)  and mature  green tomatoes  (produced primarily in Florida) 
were  chosen in a  way  that  "would have significantly reduced Mexican exports of 
tomatoes  to the United States."  Other analysis  (Jesse,  for  example)  are less 
conclusive that marketing orders constitute trade barriers.  For  a  recent 
theoretical study on whether marketing orders constitute nontariff trade 
barriers,  see  Chambers  and Pick.  Because of the controversy relating to 
whether marketing orders are  trade barriers and to measurement difficulties, 
our analysis  does  not consider marketing orders as  trade barriers.  The  most 
important U.S.  imports  from Mexico  that are subject to marketing orders are 
tomatoes,  grapes,  and onions. 
Until recently,  Mexico has maintained policies to limit supply and export 
of horticultural commodities,  most notably tomatoes.  The  National Federation 
of Vegetable Producers restricted the  number  of hectares members  could use  for 
planting and had the power  to sell certificates of origin required by Mexican 
authorities for exporting.  In June  1991,  the Mexican Government  decided to 
provide unlimited free certificates.  Because of the difficulty of quantifying 
these policies,  we  did not consider  them  in the simulation exercises.  If U.S. 
14 marketing orders  and Mexican production and export restrictions effectively 
limited trade,  then our  simulation results understate the extent that trade 
would  increase with a  PTA. 
u.s.  - MEXICO  PTA:  SCENARIO  1 
In the first scenario we  remove  price wedges  from  the  BASE  model  that 
represent  two-way border protection between the United States and Mexico. 
Impacts  on agriculture are reported in aggregate  and for  several important 
commoditi~s. 
TRAPE  IMPACTS 
Under  1988  market conditions,  model  results indicate that a  U.S.- Mexican 
PTA  would increase bilateral U.S.-Mexico  trade of agricultural commodities by 
more  than 15  percent,  approximately $650  million.  The  value of U.S. 
agricultural exports  to Mexico  would  increase almost  3  times  the  increase in 
Mexican agricultural exports  to  the United States  (Table  2).  One  reason is 
that in 1988,  Mexico's border protection was  higher than that of the United 
States. 
There would be  a  small decrease  in U.S.  agricultural exports to ROW,  due 
primarily to slightly higher world prices.  The  price increases are a  result 
of increased imports  and increased domestic  consumption by Mexico. 
ROW  experiences  only a  small  increase in D&t  exports  (a small decrease  in 
exports  and a  somewhat  larger decrease  in imports).  That is primarily due  to 
the fact that without the  PTA,  the United States accounts  for most of Mexico's 
agricultural trade.  Thus  there would be little opportunity for diverting 
Mexico's  imports  away  from  ROWand  to the United States with a  PTA.  Also,  the 
15 model ,results  show  that ROW's  aggregate exports  to  the U.S.  remain about  the 
same  after the  PTA  as before. 
Table  2--Changes  From  BASE  in Agricultural Exports,  Three 
Scenarios. 
IMPORTERS;  Total 
Exporter  U.S.  Mexico  ROW  Exports 
--Million dollars--
Scenario  1:  PTA 
United States  482  -59  423 
Mexico  166  5  171 
Rest-of-World  3  -39  -36 
Total  169  443  -54  558 
Scenario  2:  Unilateral Mexican Trade  Liberalization 
United States  435  -46  389 
Mexico  25  24  49 
Rest-of-World  16  30  46 
Total  41  465  -22  484 
Scenario  3:  PTA  Plus Mexican Trade  Liberalization 
United States  438  -44  394 
Mexico  160  18  178 
Rest-of-World  0  31  30 
Total  160  469  -26  602 
WELFARE  IMPACTS 
Studies have  examined  the welfare  implications of PTAs.  For a  review, 
see Pomfret.  Theoretical models  show  that the model  assumptions  can determine 
whether countries and the world are  shown  to gain and lose welfare  from  a 
preferential trade aggrement.  Our  model  allows  for  increasing costs  (upward 
16 sloping supply functions),  substitution in production and consumption  (cross-
price elasticities),  and  changes  in market prices,  but it does  not  include 
increasing returns  to  scale nor other dynamic  gains.  The  cited theoretical 
analyses  show  that with these assumptions  in our model,  one  cannot determine 
ex ante  the direction of shift in welfare  as  a  result of putting a  PTA  in 
place.  Model  parameters will determine  the  outcome. 
Our  model  measures  welfare as producer and consumer  surplus plus  changes 
in government  revenues/expenditures.  Results  show  that U.S.  producers  and 
consumers  of agricultural commodities  would face  slightly higher prices in 
aggregate  as  a  result of the  PTA.  Producers also would increase production 
because of expanded exports  to Mexico.  Consequently,  U.S.  producers would 
experience  a  welfare gain,  consumers  would experience  a  welfare loss,  and the 
Government would reduce  expenditures  on various  farm programs  (Table  3).6 
The  net impact would be  a  welfare gain for  the U.S.  from its agricultural 
sector. 
Model  results  show  that with a  PTA,  the prices of agricultural commodities 
in Mexico  would fall,  in aggregate.  As  a  result,  Kexicar  ,)nsumers  would 
experience  a  substantial welfare  gain and producers woula  .ow  a  10ss.7 
6  Government net expenditures decline because  the reduction in domestic 
support  (mainly deficiency payments),  due  to slightly higher  farm prices, 
exceeds  the loss of tariff revenue. 
7  Welfare  changes  are not  reported for  the Kexican cattle sector in the 
aggregated numbers.  They are reported in the livestock/meat/dairy sector below. 
The  reason for this omission in the aggregate numbers  is that the cattle market 
is segmented,  a  characteristic which is not adequately captured in our modeling 
framework.  Essentially,  feeder  cattle located in the northern states are  the 
only tradable segment of the market.  Cattle produced primarily for domestic use 
are considered to be non-tradable. 
Our  model  includes all Mexican cattle,  creating the  impression that  the 
removal of an export tax directly affects the entire cattle stock.  Thus,  there 
is a  substantial overstatement of the welfare gains to producers  and losses  to 
consumers.  There also would be an overstatement of the changes  in cattle trade 
17 The  Government  would experience  a  net decline in revenue  from  loss 
Table  3--Changes  From  BASE  in Welfare,  Three  Scenarios 
Source of welfare  change  U. S.  Mexico  ROW  World 
--Million dollars--
Scenario 1:  PTA 
Producer welfare 
Consumer  welfare 
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Scenario 2:  Unilateral Mexican Trade  Liberalization 
Producer welfare 
Consumer  welfare 
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Scenario  3:  PTA  Plus Mexican Trade  liberalization 
Producer welfare 
Consumer  welfare 
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of tariff receipts and quota rents.  The  net  impact is a  small welfare  gain 
for Mexico  from its agricultural sector. 
Because of somewhat higher world prices,  the  PTA  generates welfare gains 
to producers  and welfare losses  to consumers  in ROW.  The  net result is a 
small net loss in welfare. 
The  above welfare changes  sum  up  to a  small net welfare gain for  the 
but we  lowered the supply and demand elasticities to reflect the inclusion of the 
entire cattle stock rather than the  tradable  segment of the  feeder herd. 
18 world asa whole.  The  largest gain goes  to Mexican consumers.  The  largest 
loss  comes  from  consumers  in ROW.  The  magnitudes  of net gains  are very small, 
as  is usually the case with static world  trade models.  To  reiterate an 
earlier point,  important potential sources of dynamic welfare gains  from 
reduced trade barriers  (such as  income  growth or economies  of scale)  are 
assumed away  in this model. 
IMPLICATIONS  FOR  COMMODITY  GROUPS 
The  United States'  main  farm exports  to Mexico  are  feed grains,  oilseeds, 
live animals,  meat,  and dairy products.  These  exports likely would expand 
with liberalized trade.  We  estimate that grains  and oilseeds would account 
for nearly 90  percent of the expansion in U.S.  agricultural exports  (Table 4). 
With  the rise of exports  to Mexico,  total U.S.  agricultural exports  to all 
countries,  would  increase less than 2  percent. 
Mexico's  main exports  to  the United States are tropical and specialty 
crops  such as  coffee,  fruits,  and vegetables,  as well as  live animals. 
Horticultural products would account for over half of Mexico's  expansion of 
exports  to the U.S.  There would also be  an increase in Mexican exports of 
feeder cattle. 
The  PTA  examined here  implies  a  small  (less than I-percent)  net 
expansion in U.S.  agricultural production.  Producers of some  commodities  such 
as  feed grains would  expand production.  Producers of some  commodities  such as 
certain horticultural products,  would slightly reduce production.  No 
horticultural product in the model  showed  a  production decline in excess of 2 
percent. 
The  expansion of production of export-oriented commodities would be 
19 small because agricultural exports  to Mexico  represent a  small proportion of 
u.s.  production.  Corn is a  good  example.  Corn exports  to Mexico  are 
estimated to  increase about  65  percent due  to  the  removal  of Mexican border 
restrictions.  But  this large percentage change  only represents  about  a  3 
Table 4--Changes  From  BASE  in Agricultural  Exports by Commodity  Group. 







































































percent increase in total U.S.  corn exports  and less than a  1  percent increase 
in production. 
20 GRAINS  AND  OILSEEDS 
When  Mexican border protection vis-a-vis the United States is removed, 
domestic prices in Mexico  of U.S.  crops  decline.  Corn and other coarse grains 
experience price declines of over  30  percent  (Table  5).  Mexican consumers 
increase their demand  by over  50  percent for U.S.  coarse grains as well as 
oilseeds and products while  reducing their demand  for Mexican produced crops. 
Table  5--Changes  From  BASE  in Agricultural Production,  Consumption, 
and Prices for  Select Grains  and Oilseeds  in Mexico  and the United 




U.S.  corn 
Mexican corn 




Mexican other coarse grain  -10.9 
United States 
U.S.  corn  0.3 
U.S.  other coarse grain  1.7 
Consumption  Price 
--Percent--
64.0  -33.2 
-7.3  -15.9 
50.1  -32.3 
-13.9  -15.8 
-0.8  1.1 
-2.1  2.3 
1/ As  mentioned earlier in the paper,  U.S.,  Mexican,  and Rest-of-Wor1d corn 
are assumed not to be homogeneous  but,  instead,  are  imperfect substitutes. 
Thus  all three  types  of corn are available in each country or region,  but the 
United States produces  only U.S.  corn and Mexico  produces  only Mexican corn. 
The  increase  in Mexican demand  of U.S.  produced products has  a  marginal 
effect on U.S.  prices.  For  example,  corn and other coarse grain producer 
prices  increase by 1  and  2  percent,  respectively.  The  higher prices encourage 
a  slight production response;  corn and other coarse grain supply expand 0.3 
and 1.7 percent,  respectively. 
The  United States increases its corn and other coarse grain exports  $186 
and $100  million,  respectively,  shipping $219  and $123  million more  to Mexico 
21 and $33  and $23  million less to  ROW  (Figure 4).  U.S.  exports  $84 million more 
of oi1seeds  and products  and $4  million more  of wheat  to Mexico. 
Mexican coarse grain imports  from  the United States expand by about  60 
percent relative to our  1988  base period  (Figure 4).  This  increases  the 
interdependence between the United  States and Mexico  as Mexican  imports  from 
the United States comprise  around 
40  percent of domestic  consumption 
(Table  6).  Historically,  coarse 
grain imports  comprise  25  to  30 
percent of domestic use,  although 
there has been substantial 
variation from year to year.  The 
U.S.  share of the Mexican oilseed 
market also expands. 
U.S.  farmers  realize an 
increase in net  income  of nearly 
$340  million or 0.7 percent of 
farm value,  about  60  percent 
attributed to corn and other 
coarse grains  (Table  7). 
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Additionally,  with the  increase in market prices,  U.S.  government deficiency 
payments  to farmers  decrease  $280  million.  Marginally higher commodity 
prices,  though,  cost U.S.  consumers  $140  million for coarse grains and $115 
million for oi1seeds  and products. 
22 In Mexico  the  removal  of import restrictions on grains  and oilseeds 
affects producers,  the  government  treasury,  and consumers.  Producer and 
government  incomes  are  reduced by  the loss  in sales and  the exclusivity 
associated with  import  licenses.  Without  the  import restrictions,  producer 
Table  6--The Unites States'  Share of Mexican Grains  and Oilseed 
Market,  BASE  and Scenario 1. 
Commodity  BASE  Scenario 1  (PTA) 
--Percent--
Wheat  9  10 
Corn  23  34 
Other Coarse Grains  31  44 
Soybeans  83  84 
Soybean Meal  26  28 
Soybean Oils  12  13 
Other Oilseeds  12  16 
Other Meals  2  3 
Other Oils  27  30 
income  falls over  $390  million,  $204 million in corn alone  (Table  7).  Quota 
rents,  mostly associated with  CONASUPO,  decline $389  million,  $324 million in 
coarse grains  (corn and other coarse grains).  The  government,  though,  reduces 
the value of domestic  subsidies  ?y  $27  million because of lower production 
levels. 8  Consumers  are large bt.leficiaries of the  PTA,  experiencing an 
increase  in consumer welfare of $835  million,  $381  million in corn and $207 
million in other coarse grains.  If CONASUPO  subsidies  to agribusiness and 
consumers  are also eliminated or reduced,  then the benefits accruing to 
consumers  would be less than we  have  indicated and the loss of the quota rents 
would be offset. 
8  In the  simulation analysis we  assume  that input subsidies to producers 
on a  per unit bases  remains  constant.  This  implies  that the total value of 
input subsidies declines when  production levels fall. 
23 Table  7--Changes  from  BASE  in Welfare  for  Grains  and Oilseeds,  Scenario 1 
(PTA) 
Commodity  Producer  Consumer  Government  Quota  Net 
Income  Benefits  Savings  Rent  Welfare 
--Killion dollars--
UNITED  STATES: 
Wheat  2  -5  29  0  26 
Corn  156  -104  188  0  240 
Other coarse grains  55  -36  62  0  81 
Soybeans  27  -26  0  0  1 
Soymeal  19  -15  0  0  3 
Soyoil  10  -9  0  0  1 
Other oilseeds  62  -59  0  0  3 
Other meals  1  -1  0  0  0 
Other oils  7  -3  0  0  4 
Total  338  -260  279  0  357 
MEXICO: 
Wheat  -12  18  1  -5  2 
Corn  -204  381  27  -190  14 
Other coarse grains  -84  207  19  -135  7 
Soybeans  -3  64  -1  -59  2 
Soymeal  -27  51  -20  0  4 
Soyoil  -13  19  -4  0  2 
Other oilseeds  -32  63  -33  0  -2 
Other meals  -4  4  0  a  -1 
Other oils  -13  27  -14  0  -1 
Total  -392  835  -27  -389  28 
REST-OF-WORLD: 
Wheat  91  -135  0  0  -43 
Corn  153  -234  _·t\.L  0  0  -80 
Other coarse grains  100  -127  0  0  -28 
Soybeans  28  -42  0  0  -15 
Soymea1  17  -27  0  0  -10 
Soyoil  5  -6  0  0  -2 
Other oilseeds  17  -25  0  0  -89 
Other meals  6  -6  0  0  0 
Other oils  8  -13  a  0  -5 
Total  425  -615  0  0  -190 
24 LIVESTOCK  AND  DAIRY 
The  removal  of Mexican  import 
Changes  From  BASE  in the Va I ue  of  U. S . 
protection increases  the Mexican 
demand  for U.S.  livestock and 
meats  and has  a  marginal effect in 
increasing livestock and meat 
prices.  This encourages  a  small 
U.S.  supply response  in cattle and  • 
mi II ion  $  •  • 
poultry.  As  a  consequence,  the 
United States  increases its  CIlUle __  i 
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poultry  (Figure 5).  This 
represents an 8  percent increase  J'igure  5 
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• 
in U.S.  cattle exports  and  to 4  percent increase in U.S.  pork and poultry 
exports. 
Mexico  also  increases its feeder cattle exports to 1065  thousand head 
from  the 1988 base of nearly 850  thousand head,  approximately a  25  percent 
• 
increase.  This  represents  a  $55  million rise in Mexican exports  to  the United 
States,  nearly one-third of the  increase in all Mexican agricultural exports. 
Producer  income  in the United States for cattle decreases  $144 million 
because of slightly lower  fe~der prices,  less than 1  percent  (Table 8).  U.S. 
meat  and dairy farmers,  though,  experience  a  small  increase in net income,  $56 
million,  due  to the  increase in Mexican demand.  With  the United States being 
25 a  net importer of meats  from all sources,  the  change  in net welfare  for 
cattle,  meats,  and dairy products  indicates  a  small  loss of $35  million. 
Table  8--Changes  from  BASE  in Welfare  for Livestock,  Meats,  and Dairy, 
Scenario  1  (PTA) 
Producer  Consumer  Government  Quota  Net 
Commodity  Income  Benefits  Savings  Rent  Welfare 
--Million dollars--
UNITED  STATES: 
Cattle  -144  -173  -17  0  11 
Beef and veal  13  -23  0  0  -10 
Pork  12  -33  0  0  -21 
Poultry meat  19  -26  0  0  -8 
Eggs  5  -10  0  0  -5 
Milk  4  -5  0  0  -1 
Butter  1  -1  0  0  -1 
Cheese  2  -3  0  0  -1 
Milk powder  0  0  0  0  0 
Total  -88  72  -17  0  -35 
MEXICO: 
Cattle  1532  -1469  -67  0  -4 
Beef and veal  -21  24  -3  0  -1 
Pork  -12  30  -4  0  14 
Poultry meat  -12  47  -10  0  24 
Eggs  -6  14  -1  0  7 
Milk  0  0  0  0  -1 
Butter  -4  4  0  0  0 
Cheese  -4  5  -1  0  0 
Milk powder  0  0  0  0  0 
Total  1472  -1345  -87  0  40 
REST-OF-WORLD: 
Cattle  -77  77  0  0  0 
Beef and veal  18  -29  0  0  -12 
Pork  29  -57  0  0  -28 
Poultry meat  9  -22  0  0  -13 
Eggs  11  -20  0  0  -9 
Milk  19  -29  0  0  -10 
Butter  -1  1  0  0  0 
Cheese  0  0  0  0  0 
Milk powder  0  0  0  0  0 
Total  7  -79  0  0  -72 
26 In Mexico  producer net  income  for cattle,  meats,  and dairy products 
increases  $1.5 billion.  The  gain is solely attributed to cattle producers, 
who  no  longer  face  an export tax.  (See  footnote  10  for  a  caveat.)  Meat  and 
dairy producers  experience  a  small  income  loss despite  lower  feed costs.  The 
protection afforded Mexico's  domestic meat producers  from  foreign competition 
exceeds  the effects of higher  feed costs.  This result is highly dependent on 
the substitutability of U.S.  and Mexican meats,  especially poultry.  See 
sensitivity analysis.  Further,  in the  long run,  investment in the sector may 
increase,  especially if land tenure restrictions are reduced and better feed 
rations can be  adapted;  then,  producers may  experience gains. 
On  the  consumer  side,  the  removal of import protection allows  increased 
availability of meats  and dairy products  in Mexico,  lowering domestic  consumer 
prices of U.S.  products  in the  5  to  20  percent  (Table  9).  Meat product 
consumers  gain $124  million in welfare. 
Table  9--Changes  from  BASE  in Agricultural Production,  Consumption,  and Prices 
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Mexican beef 
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-0.2 HORTICULTURAL  COMMODITIES 
There  is an increase in U.S.  demand  for Mexican melons,  FCOJ,  cucumbers, 
onions,  green peppers,  and 
tomatoes with the  removal  of U.S. 
import tariffs  (Table 10).  As  a 
result,  Mexico  expands  production 
in vegetables,  approximately  2  to 
7  percent and  in FCOJ,  nearly 19 
percent.  Its export volume 
expands  in the  range of 5  to 15 
percent· for vegetables  and  20 
percent for  FCOJ,  equal  to $45 
million  (Figure 6). 
Mexican output expands  and 
producer  income  increases by  $32 
million or 2  percent of 
horticultural farm value  (Table 
11). 
The  removal  of U.S.  tariffs 
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on horticultural products results in price decreases  in the U.S.  ranging from 
o to 2  percent of U.S._produced products and 4  to 9  percent for Mexican 
produced products  (Table 10).  American consumers  experience a  $72  million 
gain in benefits due  to  lower prices and  increased purchases.  Producers  lose 
$31  million and government tariff revenue  decreases  $52  million.  The  loss in 
producer  income  represents 1.0 percent of sales.  The  increased aarket 
28 Table .10--Production,  Consumption,  and Price Responses  for 
Horticultural Commodities 
Country/ 
Commodity  Production  Consumption  Price 







































































penetration of the U.S.  market by Mexican fruits and vegetables is very small, 
1  to  3  percent  (Table 12). 
SENSITIVITY  ANALYSIS 
Grain trade,  mostly corn,  dominates  the aggregate results presented 
above.  Two  modifications are made  in scenario 1  to see how  sensitive the 
results are  to changes  in assumptions  relating to Mexican grains and soybeans. 
First,  (scenario la)  we  examine modifications in Mexican domestic policy 
29 Table  ll--Changes  from  BASE  in Welfare  for Horticultural Products,  Scenario 1 
(PTA)  1/ 
Producer  Consumer  Government  Quota  Net 
Commodity  Income  Benefits  Savings  Rent  Welfare 
--Million dollars--
UNITED  STATES: 
Melons  -4  9  -4  0  0 
Frozen concentrate 
orange juice  -6  21  -21  0  -7 
Cucumber  -3  7  -5  0  -1 
Onions  -6  11  -7  0  -1 
Green peppers  -3  7  -4  0  0 
Tomatoes  -9  18  -10  0  -2 
Total  -31  72  -52  0  -12 
MEXICO: 
Melons  3  -1  0  0  2 
Frozen concentrate 
orange juice  12  0  0  0  12 
Cucumber  2  -1  0  0  2 
Onions  5  -3  0  0  2 
Green peppers  3  -2  0  0  1 
Tomatoes  7  -5  0  0  2 
Total  32  -12  0  0  19 
REST-OF-WORLD: 
Melons  -1  0  0  0  -1 
Frozen concentrate 
orange juice  -6  0  0  0  -6 
Cucumber  0  0  0  0  0 
Onions  -1  1  0  0  0 
Green peppers  -1  1  0  0  0 
Tomatoes  2  -3  0  0  -1 
Total  -6  0  0  0  -7 
30 Table 12--Mexico's  Share of u.S.  Fruit and Vegetable Market,  BASE 























toward corn,  other coarse grains,  and soybeans  as part of a  PTA.  We  assume  in 
scenari  1a that Mexican producer  (input)  subsidies are set equal  to u.S. 
producer  (mainly deficiency payment)  subsidies  on a  per unit basis.8  This 
implies  that Mexican subsidies  (per metric  ton)  are reduced from  $35  for corn, 
$33  for other coarse grains,  and $91  for  soybeans  to $31,  $15,  and $59, 
respectively.  This  represents  about  a  30  percent reduction of Mexican 
domestic  crop  support in addition to  the  removal of the  import tariff 
equivalents.  Results  show  an 8-percent increase in the  growth in U.S.  exports 
of grains and oi1seeds  compared to scenario 1.  (See Table  13  for aggregate 
trade results.)  Other trade adjustments  are minor.  The  absolute value of all 
welfare  impacts  are marginally reduced. 
In addition to  the assumptions  in scenario la,  we  reduced the elasticity 
of substitution in consumption of Mexican corn for u.S.  corn fro. 3  to 1 
(scenario 1b).  This reduction assumes  that Mexican consumers  are less willing 
to substitute yellow corn for white corn in their diet.  Hence,  the  increase 
9  U.S.  support is main1y.in the  form  of deficiency payments while Mexican 
domestic  support is largely input subsidies.  The  modeling  framework  treats 
the effect of these policies equally. 
31 Table  l3--Changes  from  BASE  in Agricultural Exports,  Sensitivity 
of Scenario 1 
Importers: 





Scenario 1a:  PTA  and Modification of Mexican Corn Policies 
United States  522  -66  456 
Mexico  166  3  169 
Rest-of-Wor1d  4  -39  -34 
Total  170  483  -63  591 
Scenario 1b:  Scenario 1a and Modification of Mexican Corn  Demand 
United States  390  -48  341 
Mexico  166  3  169 
Rest-of-Wor1d  2  -39  -37 
Total  168  351  -45  473 
Scenario lc:  PTA  and Modification of Mexican Poultry Demand 
United States  472  -59  413 
Mexico  165  5  170 
Rest-of-Wor1d  3  -39  -36 
Total  168  433  -54  619 
Scenario 1d:  PTA  Assuming  10  Percent Mexican  Income  Growth 
United States  630  -67  563 
Mexico  73  -13  60 
Rest-of-Wor1d  31  -19  11 
Total  104  611  -80  634 
in demand  for U.S.  corn by Mexicans,  due  to a  PTA,  is diminished and there is 
a  smaller price increase of U.S.  corn. 
Results  show  that the  assumptions of scenario lb reduce  the response of 
U.S.  grain/oilseed exports  to Mexico,  due  to  the  PTA,  by over 20  percent 
32 relative to results  in scenario 1.  U.S.  welfare estimates  (shown  in table 4 
for scenario 1)  are reduced by  almost  50  percent as  the  gains  to  farmers  and 
savings by  government are lessened.  However,  total welfare  changes  in Mexico 
are nearly the  same  as  in scenario 1.  These  changes  in assumptions  reduce  the 
price responsiveness of Mexico's  demand  for U.S.  corn.  Thus  the  trade and 
welfare responses  to  a  PTA  in the U.S.  and  ROW  are sensitive to these  changes, 
but Mexican welfare  is not. 
These  two  sensitivity experiments  show  that the  aggregate results are 
moderately sensitive to assumptions  about corn policy and consumption behavior 
in Mexico. 
Our  next change  in assumptions  relates to  the pOUltry sector.  The 
removal  of import barriers on  feed grains  reduces  the production costs for 
poultry and generates  a  supply response.  The  rise in poultry production 
reduces  the domestic price of poultry and consumption expands.  Because  the 
Mexican pOUltry  inspection system fails  to meet U.S.  requirements,  there is 
virtually no  foreign demand  for Mexican pOUltry.  With no outlet for the 
increased pOUltry production,  the domestic price falls until domestic  supply 
equals  domestic  demand. 
The  rise in Mexican pOUltry production would not reduce  domestic prices 
(small country case)  if the Mexican market is fully integrated with the world 
market and if pOUltry is a  homogeneous  product in international ..  rkets. 
Instead,  there would be a  quantity adjustment;  Mexico  would substitute 
towards  domestic producers  and away  from U.S.  and foreign imports. 
Scenario  1  assumes  a  limited substitutability between Mexican and U.S. 
pOUltry  (elasticity of substitution equals  3).  If Mexicans  perceive U.S.  and 
Mexican poultry to be more  similar,  then there would be  a  greater substitution 
33 away  from U.s.  imports  towards  domestic poultry.  In scenario lc we  adjust the 
parameters  to allow for  a  greater substitution. 10 
To  see  the difference in effects  from  the  change  in assumptions,  we  first 
remove  only feed grain trade policies.  The  removal  of feed grain import 
barriers reduces Mexican pOUltry  imports  from  54  to 44  thousand metric  tons 
compared to  51  thousand metric  tons when  there  is less substitution.  With 
both livestock and feed grain restrictions eliminated,  Mexican  imports  of u.s. 
poultry essentially do  not change.  (Compared  to scenario 1,  pOUltry  imports 
increased to 67  thousand metric  tons  (Table 14).  Thus,  the  change  in pOUltry 
trade is very dependent  on Mexican consumers'  perception of the 
substitutability between U.S.  and Mexican pOUltry and homogeneity of the 
pOUltry sector. 
One  further experiment  (scenario ld)  is conducted to provide sensitivity 
analysis  on changes  in income  reSUlting from  a  PTA.  The  opening of the 
Mexican economy  by reducing state-owned enterprises,  government regulation of 
industry,  and  government  intervention in commercial policies may  encourage 
investment,  employment,  and economic  growth in Mexico.  Higher growth rates 
lead to increases  in disposable  income  available to purchase  domestic  and 
foreign foods. 
In our partial equilibrium analysis economic  growth is not endogenously 
modeled.  However,  an exogenous  estimate of changes  in income  can be  included 
in the  commodity  demand  equations.  Some  of the general equilibriua analyses 
indicate that Mexican and U.S.  income  growth resulting from  a  PTA  would be 
10  Specifically,  we  increased (in Mexico)  the cross price elasticity of 
demand  for U.S.  pOUltry with respect to the price of Mexican pOUltry and the 
own  price elasticity of demand  for Mexican pOUltry.  The  two  parameter changes 
proximate  a  greater substitutability of U.S.  and Mexican poultry and a  more 
homogeneous  Mexican poultry sector relative to other international producers. 
34 Table  l4--Mexican Poultry Production,  Imports,  and Consumption Under 
Alternative Assumptions,  Scenario  1 
Domestic 
Production 
Imports  from 
United States  Consumption 
--1,000 metric  tons--
1988  BASE 
Remove  all trade barriers 
low cross price elasticity 











10dels understate the  income 
effect because  they do  not consider  the rate  ~  growth varying endogenously 
with changes  in government policy.  An  opening of the Mexican  economy  would 
promote  endogenous  technical  change  due  to specialization in product lines and 
increase worker experience.  He  claims  that Mexico  could attain as high as  a 
25  percent increase  in output per worker  over a  25  year period. 
Scenario 1  implicitly assumes  that there are no  changes  in income  for 
the U.S.  or Mexico.  In scenario ld we  assume  that Mexican  income  increases  10 
percent and there is no  income  change  in the U.S.  Scenario ld roughly 
parallels Kehoe's hypothesis over an intermediate run.  All other policy 
assumptions  in scenario ld correspond to scenario 1. 
Our  results indicate that there are moderate  trade effects associated 
with scenario ld.  With  income  increasing in Mexico  there is an expansion in 
demand  for both domestic  and foreign products.  Mexico  has  less available for 
foreign sale and hence,  exports decline  65  percent relative to scenario 1.  On 
the  import side,  Mexican p"","chases  from  the United States  increase  30 percent 
compared to scenario 1.  largest increase  (90 percent)  is in meats. 
35 UNILATERAL  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION  IN  MEXICO:  SCENARIO  2 
In scenario  2  all Mexican  trade barriers are eliminated.  This  scenario 
represents  the extreme position of current Mexican policies of liberalizing 
the  economy. 
Scenario  2  leads  to an expansion of Mexican  imports of agricultural 
commodities of the  same  magnitude  as with a  PTA--with  the U.S.  capturing most 
of that increase  (Table  2).  But Mexican exports  increase very little, mainly 
because U.S.  trade barriers do  not change  in this scenario.  The  value of 
world agricultural trade  increases  somewhat  less than with the first scenario. 
Welfare gainers  and losers in the U.S.  and Mexico  are the  same  as  in the 
first scenario--only more  so  (Table  3).  U.S.  producers enjoy the benefits of 
expanded exports  to Mexico  without  facing  lower border protection on  imports 
from  Mexico.  Mexican producers are worse off than in the first scenario,  but 
consumers  are better off.  Consumers  benefit from  no  increase in prices of 
those  commodities  that Mexico  would export with a  PTA. 
U.S.- MEXICO  PTA  AND  A MEXICAN  TRADE  LIBERALIZATION:  SCENARIO  3 
In scenario  3  all Mexican  trade barriers are eliminated plus  the United 
States and Mexico  agree on a  PTA.  Effectively,  this scenario indicates  the 
impact of a  lower bound  impact of a  PTA--one  in which Mexico  completely 
liberalized and then signed a  PTA--rather  than an upper bound scenario where 
Mexico  and the United States agreed to a  PTA  given 1988  conditions. 
Changes  in agricultural trade among  the  3  country/regions,  caused by the 
combined  impact of the  two  assumed border policy changes,  look quite similar 
to  the results obtained from  the first scenario--a PTA  only  (Table  2). 
36 Changes  in welfare within and between the  3  country/regions also are quite 
similar to  those of the first scenario  (Table  3). 
A comparison of scenario  3  with scenario 1  indicates that a  U.S.-Mexico 
PTA  has  a  relatively large  impact  on U.S.-Mexican agricultural trade. 
However,  the additional  impact  that could be  obtained from  Mexico  removing its 
agricultural trade barriers with all other countries is quite small.  ROW 
would not be  affected much  by either policy change  in Mexico. 
A comparison of this scenario with scenario 2  gives  an indication of the 
impact of a  U.S.-Mexican PTA ~  Mexico  would unilaterally remove  border 
protection with all countries.  The  additional  impact of the  PTA  is to  remove 
U.S.  border protection and enable Mexican exports  to  the U.S.  to expand.  As 
expected,  having this market access  to  the United States is a  critical aspect 
for Mexico.  However,  U.S.  exports  remain virtually the  same  as  in Scenario  2. 
There  is a  very small net increase  in welfare,  compared with scenario 2,  for 
the agricultural sector in both the United States and Mexico. 
A comparison of scenario  3 with scenario  2  suggests that there would be  a 
small but positive net welfare gain for  the U.S.  from  a  PTA  with Mexico  if 
Mexico  were  to first liberalize its own  economy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The  total removal  of border protection (scenario 1)  provides  an upper 
bound on the  intermediate-run impact of a  PTA  on U.S.  and Mexican agriculture 
and agricultural trade.  Model  results indicate that the United States and 
Mexico  increase agricultural trade and there is an  improvement  in welfare for 
both countries.  However,  the  implied adjustments  to  the agricultural sectors 
result in quite different affected parties. 
37 Bilateral agricultural trade  is estimated to  increase by  15  percent,  a  20 
percent increase in U.S.  exports  to Mexico  and a  10 percent  increase  in 
Mexican exports  to  the United States.  Relative to the size of the  two 
agricultural sectors,  however,  the overall  impact is very small for U.S. 
agriculture but somewhat  more  significant for adjustment of Mexican 
agriculture. 
In the United States  there are  income  gains  to producers of grains  and 
meat products,  and exports of these commodities  expand.  Producers of 
horticultural products  incur small  income  losses,  as Mexican fruits  and 
vegetables become  more  competitive with U.S.  produced commodities.  Our 
results indicate that there is less than a  2  percent decrease  in U.S. 
production of any of the fruits  and vegetables.  This  is less than typical 
year-to-year fluctuations  in U.S.  production. 
Our  analysis suggests  that Mexican consumers  and agroprocessors attain 
significant gains  from  a  PTA.  Consumers  benefit mostly in grains,  oilseeds, 
and meat products.  Mexican  farmers  who  produce  these commodities,  though, 
experience  income  losses.  For  those on small crop  farms,  a  substantial labor 
adjustment may  be necessary.  The  expansion in the horticultural sector could 
absorb  some  additional labor resources. 
Unilateral Mexican trade liberalization generates about the  same  overall 
magnitude of impact  on U.S.  and Mexican agriculture as  the  PTA.  Mexico 
agriculture garnishes additional gains,  mostly in horticulture,  when  the 
United States also allows  free access.  If Mexico  were  to continue to 
liberalize its trade prior to putting a  PTA  in place,  then the additional 
economic  impact of the  PTA  would be  reduced. 
38 The  size of the overall economic  impact of the  PTA  also will be  affected 
by to what extent Mexican domestic policy modifies its support for  consumers 
and producers of staples such as  corn.  These  decisions  could have  a  large 
impact  on the potential U.S.  gains  in exports,  and on adjustments  that would 
need to be made  by Mexican  farmers. 
Similar to most quantitative analysis,  our estimates are based on a  model 
which is a  simple  representation of the real world.  As  such,  there are 
several considerations not  included in the analysis.  First,  our results are 
based on a  complete agricultural liberalization of two-way border policies by 
the United States and Mexico  and may  not reflect the extent nor the  timing of 
a  potential agreement.  Second,  our results are based on a  liberalization from 
the year 1988  rather than the date an agreement may  actually take place. 
Third,  our analysis  does  not  include  Canada,  which would be  included in a 
North American Free Trade Agreement.  Fourth,  our analysis does not consider 
reforms  in safety and health regulations,  changes  in the macroeconomic 
environment,  or liberalization in other traded sectors.  The  effect of a  PTA 
on Mexican  income  growth,  and ultimately on growth in demand,  is not 
endogenously measured.  This factor could be  a  key variable in determining the 
effects of a  PTA.  Increased income  growth in Mexico  due  to a  PTA  would expand 
U.S.  agricultural exports  to Mexico.  Fifth,  and probably even more  important, 
this research says nothing about  the political impact of a  PTA.  A PTA  might 
foster a  more  stable economic  environment  in Mexico which could provide long 
run benefits outstripping those benefits estimated in this study.  The  net 
impact of these  five  factors  could be  larger than measured here. 
39 
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